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Abstract 
Drawing attention to the wider literature on the linkages between 
civic engagement and democracy, this paper starts off by asking the 
question whether civic engagement beyond formal politics actually 
serves to strengthen democracy in Indonesia. Noting a contradiction 
between the literature that proposes that high associational density 
fosters democracy and recent analysis that highlights that political 
opportunity structures in Indonesia are unfavourable to popular 
representation and participation, the paper draws attention to a 
largely underexplored field within Indonesian democracy studies, 
namely that of mobilisation and participation by marginalised 
groups. The paper discusses and analyses strategies for bottom-up 
mobilisation, specifically the development planning programmes 
of Musrenbang, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), 
and Indonesian labour organising. The analysis focuses on the 
democratising aspects of these sectors, arguing that participation 
and mobilisation lacks the necessary popular foundations as well 
as organisational capacities that are necessary for participatory 
1 The article is written with support from the NUFU funded project Power, 
Conflict and Democracy (PCD) based at the University of Oslo, Gadjah Mada 
University, Indonesia, and the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. The work was 
carried out at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of 
Oslo, and the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. 
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2 institutions to effectively enhance democracy. The paper thereby 
hints that associational density in and of itself is a poor indicator 
for democracy, especially in relation to democratic consolidation 
in new democracies. 
Introduction
Does civic engagement beyond participation in formal politics 
actually strengthen democracy in Indonesia? Compared to other 
new democracies, research shows that Indonesia enjoys extraordinary 
high levels of civil engagement as identified by popular participation 
in associational life (Lussier & Fish, 2012). According to the Asian 
Barometer Survey, roughly 84 per cent of Indonesians belong to 
at least one organisation compared to 61 per cent in Malaysia and 
51 per cent in Thailand (Lussier & Fish, 2012, p.74). According 
to the same survey, the most popular organisations are residential 
and community associations, religious groups, and trade unions. In 
addition, civic engagement, including participation in residential 
and community associations, includes more or less formalised 
participation at community level in state and donor-initiated 
participatory development programmes. 
Especially the latter has grown in importance since the 
transition to democracy in 1998, building on models of community 
participation and participatory budgeting in development. The World 
Bank reports that by 2009, 60,000 Indonesian villages had taken part 
in World Bank-supported Community Driven Development (CDD) 
programmes that used participatory models to identify development 
needs, distribute funds, and implement development programmes 
– making it one of the world’s largest community-based poverty 
reduction programmes. In addition, the Indonesian government 
has launched programmes at the regional and local levels that build 
on similar ideals for popular participation and budgeting of state-
development funds, known as Musrenbang.
Do such high levels of civic engagement enhance popular 
representation in politics, and thereby the quality of democracy 
in Indonesia? To what extent do high levels of civic engagement 
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3of the kind described above actually serve as good indicators of a 
well-functioning process of democratisation? After all, contrary to 
anticipations that high levels of civic engagement fosters democracy, 
alternative research on the quality of democracy in Indonesia 
concludes that “the political opportunity structure remains 
unfavourable to popular representation and participation” (Törnquist 
et al., 2009, p.213). Following up on the contradiction, this article is 
an early attempt to assess the actual structure, working, and content 
of two arenas of civic engagement – community participation in 
development and labour organising.
In the following, I first discuss the links made in the literature 
between civic engagement, including civic engagement through 
community participation in development, and democracy. By 
drawing attention to the growing insights on the deficits of 
Indonesian democracy, the article challenges perspectives that 
view participation at community level, per se, as an indicator of 
a well-functioning democracy. Second, the paper focuses on the 
inner workings and limitations of bottom-up participation and 
mobilisation in Indonesia by specifically looking into the state-run 
regional development planning process, Musrenbang, including 
neighbourhood associations known as Rukun Warga (RW) and 
Rukun Tetangga (RT), the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development 
Program (KDP)2, and labour organising in Indonesia.3
2  The KDP is the forerunner to the Indonesian government’s flagship poverty 
reduction program, the National Program for Community Empowerment 
(Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, PNPM), first launched in 
2008. The PNPM is a direct replication of the KDP and relies on World Bank 
loans and transfers. Due to availability of reports and data, the focus in this 
paper is on the KDP, but insights can be transferred to the logic and workings 
of the PNPM as well. 
3 The data for this assessment is gathered through readings of documents and 
evaluation report commissioned by Indonesian and international NGOs, the 
World Bank development team, international labour unions, as well as case 
studies and independent reports. Due to the specific context within which such 
reports and documents have been written, their role and content merit a brief 
note. The sources themselves are often reflective of the kinds of political and 
ideological positions of the institution that commissioned them in the first place. 
An evaluation report with predefined chapters set in a specific discourse of the 
donor institution contains different information than those commissioned by 
NGOs or a journalistic account and analysis. In reviewing documents for this 
article, this has been predominant in terms of evidence. For instance, the vast 
majority of reporting on community participation in development focuses not 
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4 The main reason for this delimitation to community 
participation and labour unions is that they represent both informal 
and formal arenas through which individuals and communities 
interact directly with political authorities over budgeting and the 
use of donor and government funds. Moreover, both community 
participation and labour organising are considered as indicators for 
bottom-up participation and mobilisation as well as central for pro-
poor empowerment. The conclusion focuses on tentative avenues 
for further research and directions to take research on the linkages 
between poverty alleviation programmes and democracy. 
Linking civic engagement and democratisation  
Recent contributions to the discussion on civic engagement 
and democracy in Indonesia build on, among others, Almond and 
Verba’s study of civic culture in western democracies (Almond & 
Verba, 1963; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). This proposed that high 
levels of civic engagement in associations strengthened and sustained 
democracy by building a civic culture. Regarding Indonesia, 
Lussier and Fish (2012) argued that the high level of associational 
membership in Indonesia strengthened democracy in three specific 
ways. Firstly, by cultivating efficacy among individuals at the local 
level that built a perception that the individual could impact change 
at higher levels of politics. Secondly, by developing civic skills that 
enabled citizens to participate in politics more effectively. Thirdly, by 
providing avenues for recruitment into more formal politics (Lussier 
& Fish, 2012, p.77). This argument also could be extended to the 
more informal and ad hoc protests commonly associated with student 
demonstrations and pro-poor protests across Indonesia (Lussier & 
Fish, 2012, p.78). 
The literature on participatory development makes similar kinds 
on the political aspects of the programmes, i.e. how their implementation and 
adaptation shapes local and national politics and power relations, but rather 
on their strengths and weaknesses in relation to pre-defined indicators. Yet, 
through triangulation and readings of multiple sources, the reports and wider 
readings give valuable insights and indicators of the weaknesses and strengths 
of participatory programmes ahead of case-oriented ethnographic accounts for 
future research. 
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5of assumptions regarding the effect of popular and civic engagement 
on democracy. For instance, a World Bank report notes that villagers’ 
participation in the process of development planning and decision-
making provides an arena for bottom-up democratic governance 
(Guggenheim et al., 2004). Accordingly, there is an expectation that 
high levels of participation in local associations by ordinary people 
not only improves the quality of democracy in Indonesia, but also is 
a central determinant for the building of democratic institutions and 
the long-term consolidation of democracy. Breaking with technocratic 
and top-down focus in development work, Putnam’s ideas on social 
capital became a useful tool for turning attention towards society 
and community, and for thinking about the building of democratic 
institutions from the bottom up (Putnam et al., 1993). Specifically, 
the connection between social capital and democracy is that the 
presence of strong civic associations at the local level nurtures trust 
and breeds a capacity for ordinary people to engage politically. Civic 
engagement at the local level will thus enable the creation of trust-
networks and cooperation that strengthens a community’s social 
capital altogether and, thus, creates necessary links between people 
in civil society and people working in government (Putnam et al., 
1993). 
The focus on links between civic engagement and democracy 
as indicators of a flourishing democracy evident in the general and 
context-specific literature on democracy, is in stark contrast to the 
scholarly critique of the deficits of Indonesian democracy since 
the transition to democracy in 1998. It is surprising then that in 
spite of the high levels of civic engagement, little research has been 
carried out to assess its role in the democratisation process. Instead, 
research on democracy in Indonesia has focused on the workings of 
formal democratic institutions, specifically on elections and electoral 
mobilisation at the national and local levels, the role of political elites, 
state institutions, political parties, and civil society. For instance, 
research on democratic institutions has highlighted the structural 
and institutional limitations of core state institutions (Hedman, 
2005, pp.31-150; Mietzner, 2007; Bünte & Ufen, 2009; Tomsa, 
2009). The literature on local politics and decentralisation reforms 
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6 has demonstrated the complexities of power, politics, and business 
in local level politics. In particular, the role of local elites and the 
emergence of political goons in hampering and shaping democracy at 
the local level limits not only the quality of democracy per se, but has 
created a system in which personalised and patrimonial networking 
is a central feature of local elections, and the inner workings of 
local parliaments (Sidel, 2004; Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007; van 
Klinken, 2007; Hadiz, 2010). 
Regarding Indonesian political parties, one verdict is that while 
the Indonesian party system is surprisingly stable compared to that 
of other countries in the region, it is less efficient in channelling the 
concerns of poor communities, excluded groups, and minorities. 
Also, it has proven to be less efficient in formulating a broad reformist, 
cleavage-based development agenda (Ufen, 2008). Research on civil 
society shows that while anti-reformist elites are the main force 
behind a stagnation in democratic progress in recent years, civil 
society emerges “as democracy’s most important defender” (Mietzner, 
2012, p.209). As mentioned, research on the aspects of civil society 
that encompasses the democracy movement has instead showed 
that civic activists and pressure groups that brought democracy to 
Indonesia are “floating in the margins of the fledging democratic 
system being unable to make a real impact” (Nababan et al., 2005; 
Harriss et al., 2004, pp.17-18). In contrast to what one should 
expect, while representatives from civil society are able to check anti-
reformist elites through protests and political mobilisation, they seem 
to be rather weak in actually instigating political reform, entering 
into formal politics by winning elections, or curbing anti-reformist 
elements (Samadhi & Warouw, 2008; Törnquist, 2009; Mietzner, 
2012). Hence, democratisation in Indonesia has come a long way in 
terms of political freedoms and the role of civil society, but research 
has showed that the democratisation process has stagnated when it 
comes to improving representation. 
Against this backdrop, attention to the dynamics of civic 
engagement, associational life, and mobilisation beyond formal 
politics is an existing gap in the research on democracy in Indonesia. 
The remainder of this article thus discusses the dynamics of existing 
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7alternative channels of bottom-up civic engagement and mobilisation 
that one expects to have impacts on the overall quality of the 
democratisation in Indonesia. 
Musrenbang: Community participation and the state
Since the fall of the New Order and the transition to democracy 
in 1998, community participation in community development, 
usually referred to as development planning, has evolved in tandem 
with decentralisation and the strengthening of regional governments, 
much modelled on Porto Allegre in Brazil. Popular demands for 
accountable government, combined with a strengthened NGO 
sector and increased significance of elections, have also brought about 
shift in the way government has dealt with the demands of ordinary 
people. Participation in decision making, planning, and budgeting 
was thus as much a demand from communities and NGOs as a result 
of shifts on official development discourse away from technocratic 
top-down implementation of development programmes towards 
bottom-up participatory models of development.4
Formally, budget formulation for development projects at the 
provincial level has two components: one top-down budget preparation 
process which is executed through the various departments of the 
regional government (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), 
and a bottom-up planning process called Musrenbang (Musyawarah 
Perencanaan Pembangunan)5. Musrenbang is the term used for 
the development planning and multi-stakeholder consultation 
forums meant to encourage and promote community participation 
in development planning at the regional level. The processes are 
intended to complement strategic plans developed by the local 
government in the planning and allocation of development funds 
4  The significance of a shift in the development discourse towards participatory 
models for development is discussed in more detail in section four on the 
World Bank and the KDP. 
5 Musrenbang is the merging of two concepts; musyawarah, a term that describes 
how communities come together to resolve conflicts peacefully, the literal 
meaning being rule by consensus; and perencanaan pembangunan literally 
meaning development planning. Musrenbang thus combines notions of 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms for the purpose of development 
planning. 
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8 for development programmes (Sarosa et al., 2008). The structure of 
community participation through Musrenbang was first formally 
endorsed by Law 25/2004 on National Development Planning, but 
builds on a long tradition of community organising in Indonesia. 
The foundation for community participation in Indonesia 
should not be understood as an entirely new trend, however. Formally 
and organisationally, it builds on a long tradition of community 
organising, which has also been used politically to structure village 
life in relation to the state.6 Under the New Order state, the local 
community and village in the Indonesian social structure were 
streamlined and recognised and reinvented to represent ‘culture’ and 
‘tradition’ (Sidel, 2007, pp.31-32). Notions of gotong royong (mutual 
aid) and musyarawah (rule by consensus) not only figure prominently 
in ethnographic accounts of the Indonesian village (desa) and urban 
neighbourhoods (kampung), but were used to streamline the New 
Order bureaucracy from the state down to village and neighbourhood 
level (Antlöv & Cederroth, 1994; Pemberton, 1994, pp.238-39). 
As a development programme, the process of Musrenbang is in 
part a continuation of what is known as the programme of Inpres Desa 
Tertinggal (IDT, the programme for left-behind villages), which was a 
series of government poverty reduction programmes launched by the 
Suharto government in the mid-1990s. The blueprint for the original 
IDTs was to give block grants to poor villages across the country in 
an attempt to create a more efficient poverty reduction strategy. The 
IDTs also sought to incorporate new thinking on empowerment of 
the poor and planning and administration of development projects 
that ran counter to the traditional view of the Indonesian government 
of seeing development as primarily a top-down technocratic exercise. 
It also fitted very well with existing structures of musyawarah and 
gotong royong. The IDTs attracted some support from the World Bank 
and the UNDP and built on an emerging understanding among 
development specialists that poverty and underdevelopment was not 
6  Several core ethnographies highlight the vibrant associational life and structure 
of community organising in the post-colonial Indonesian village, see for 
instance (Koentjaraningrat, 1967). For an analysis on the re-invention of the 
structure of the Indonesian village, see (Antlöv & Cederroth, 1994).
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9a result of a lack of skills among the poor, but rather barriers between 
technocratic government programmes and the real needs of the 
poor. The notion was that such barriers had blocked the poor from 
accessing much needed seed capital to launch small-scale enterprises, 
or micro-schemes, that would help the poor help themselves out of 
poverty.
While programmes such as the IDT soon became the subject of 
major corruption scandals, the critique being that village heads too 
often gave the IDT money to local elites who would spend the money 
on larger-scale projects rather than the intended micro-schemes, they 
have served as an administrative platform from which to implement 
community development programmes in the post-Suharto era. Note 
that one should be careful in associating New Order programmes 
that preached pro-poor empowerment and participation directly 
with the kind of civic engagement and democratic citizenship 
that by and of itself fosters democracy. To what extent are political 
capacities fostered or contained by such programmes? The issue thus 
relates to the extent that such programmes can serve as a platform 
for empowerment and improved channels for representation in the 
post-Suharto era. 
Musrenbang: Administration and execution
Musrenbang is institutionalised at all administrative levels of 
the regional government from the village, sub-district (kecamatan), 
district, and at the city/regency, to the provincial and central 
government level (Ahmad & Weiser, 2006, p.15). In addition, a 
2007 Joint Ministerial Decree asserts that results of development 
planning from the village level should be accommodated forward to 
the higher levels, ensuring bottom-up development planning.7
Formally, Musrenbang is intended to allow citizens to 
express their aspirations and priorities in terms of development 
planning and budgeting of development funds flowing from the 
regional government. The process begins at the village (desa) and 
neighbourhood level (kelurahan) with the identification of projects 
7  Joint Ministerial Decree No0008/M.PPN/01/2007
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10 that the village would like to have. Projects are prioritised on a 
list. Planning is organised around community meetings where 
community members discuss and prioritise their development needs. 
The projects submitted by villages are discussed at planning meetings 
at the sub-district (kecamatan) level. Village chiefs, sub-district 
authorities and the Regional Development Planning Agency at the 
province and district level, Bappeda, as well as other representatives 
from the regional government and DPRD take part in the planning 
meetings. In principle the planning process is for all members of the 
community, but most case studies report that even at the most local 
of levels, the process is initiated, organised, and led by community 
leaders.
The proposals that are collected below district level, i.e. sub-
district, village and community levels, are eventually compiled by 
Bappeda of the district administrative office and discussed at a district 
meeting along with proposals from the technical departments. A 
district-level Musrenbang is organised for the preparation of the 
annual regional development plan (RKPD) by Bappeda (Beleli & 
Hoelman, 2007).
What are the general experiences and insights from available 
evaluation reports and studies of the Musrenbang process in 
Indonesia? The general critique can be summarised as follows. 
First, several reports question the real participatory aspect of the 
Musrenbang process emphasising that the process is largely driven 
by local elites, politicians, and bureaucrats. Second, in contrast to 
various models of participatory budgeting, Musrenbang does not 
actually provide opportunities for participatory budgeting, only the 
early-stage planning identification of development projects. The third 
critique concerns the limitations inherent in the planning processes 
in bringing about broader social and political change, especially with 
regard to the type of projects that are allocation. For instance, the 
large majority of projects allocated through Musrenbang are small-
scale infrastructure projects.
Below, drawing on insights from several case studies conducted 
by various evaluation teams, I discuss each point of this general 
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11critique, the potential implications of these findings, and some of the 
noted exemptions to the general critique observed in the case studies. 
Bottom-up mobilisation or top-down implementation?
The critique against how the Musrenbang process is carried 
out resonates with common critiques against participatory planning 
and budgeting. A first critique of relevance is the critique that 
participatory designs mandated by a central government do not 
foster as democratic and distributive participatory institutions as does 
bottom-up participatory designs (Avritzer, 2009, p.166). Second, in 
contexts where civil society remains fragmented, political actors are 
hostile to bottom-up participation, and the institutional set-up for 
participation is weak, it is less likely that planning processes actually 
provide better access to public goods or foster enhanced democratic 
citizenship (Avritzer, 2009, pp.164, 174).  
Considering that the Musrenbang process is primarily mandated 
by the central and local government, a recurring critique is that the 
even at the lowest administrative level, planning meetings tend to 
focus more on local leaders’ priorities than on enabling debates 
between community members and representatives of political 
authorities. In theory, the consultation processes are for all village 
members, but in practice community leaders tend to have a greater 
say in the decision making processes than the general public (ADB et 
al., 2010). From the description above, it is clear that the Musrenbang 
consultations follow a complex hierarchical structure with meetings 
at each administrative level to decide the final allocations of project 
funds at the district level Musrenbang. These district-level meeting are 
primarily an arena of official participation by members of the DPRD, 
bureaucrats from Bappeda and the other technical administrative 
offices of the local government (SKPDs). Formally, the meetings are 
open to the public, though as passive members. However, there is 
great variation in the extent that members of the community, village 
heads, representatives of local NGOs, journalists, and academics are 
invited to be present in the district level Musrenbang. Presence at 
this stage of the planning process is to ensure a formal degree of 
openness rather than a forum for deliberation and discussion.  
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12  Considering the political nature of project allocation at the 
local and district levels, there is no surprise that the process itself often 
becomes subject to intra-elite competition rather than debates within 
and between communities. While a general critique has been that 
political processes of decision making have become de-politicised, 
leading to exclusion of marginalised groups and little representation, 
(Harriss et al., 2004; Törnquist et al., 2009), when politicisation 
takes the form of contestation over votes and support blocks at 
the cost of inclusion of subaltern and excluded groups, it becomes 
problematic. While in several of the areas where the Musrenbang 
process has been studies, such as Batang Hari, Kebumen, Palu, and 
Poso to mention a few, members of the DPRD are encouraged to 
attend Musrenbang events at village and kecamatan level, usually in 
the official role as ‘advisory personnel’ or ‘resource persons’ (Sarosa et 
al., 2008). The intention is to encourage direct communication and 
interaction between decision-makers and communities in order to 
foster civil-political collaboration. However, instead of creating the 
desired effect of connecting civil and political society, the planning 
meetings instead tend to take the form of campaign meetings where 
DPRD members, mayors and district heads campaign for specific 
projects, or seek to build voting blocks. Reports describing the 
dynamics of the Musrenbang meetings in the Sumedang (kabupaten) 
and Bandung also highlight that the political debate occurs among 
participants from the political elite (Sarosa et al., 2008). The fact that 
elected members have access to budgets that community negotiators 
do not further enhances the hierarchical structure of the planning 
process (Ahmad & Weiser, 2006). 
A related critique of the Musrenbang process thus concerns the 
weak institutional set-up of the planning and budgeting process, 
specifically related to the lack of openness in budget discussions. 
There are several formal hindrances to an open budgeting process that 
reinforce the opportunities for political manipulation of the planning 
and budgeting process – first and foremost that budget documents 
are considered confidential documents. It is a general phenomenon 
that local governments remain reluctant to share information on all 
types of expenses, but especially on administrative and operating 
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13budgets and expenses. This also accounts for members of the DPRD 
whom in many areas do not always receive copies of the budget, as 
distribution among committees is selective and highly influenced by 
local party leaderships. This means that project affordability is not 
an issue until the final stage of the process, i.e. when it reaches the 
district level. In a situation where project affordability is not taken 
into account in the actual planning process, the actual outcome the 
consultations that take place at village and sub-district levels result 
in little more than unrealistic, unfounded wish lists (Ahmad & 
Weiser, 2006, pp.14-15). Another budget-related critique concerns 
the observation that there are significant discrepancies in the number 
of projects that have been planned and those that are eventually 
budgeted for and thus implemented.
Hence, the Musrenbang process suffers from limitations by formal 
regulation on the one hand and the persistence of social and political 
hierarchies on the other. Both factors ultimately reinforce structures 
of hierarchy and lack of effective channels of representation. In some 
localities, however, the critique of the budgeting process has been 
met with local initiatives and more efficient popular participation. 
As discussed below, such initiatives illustrate the importance of local 
variation and context in determining the conditions of success in 
participatory designs. 
Bottom-up strategies for improvement
To counter the limitations inherent in the formal and informal 
set-ups of the Musrenbang process, communities make use of a 
number of strategies. These strategies concern the expansion and 
strengthening of civil society’s role in the planning process. First, in 
places where NGOs are actively involved as intermediaries in exerting 
pressure on political authorities, the planning processes seem to be 
more effective. Second, by expanding the district planning process to 
include more stakeholders, it seems that the process becomes more 
inclusive. 
The main avenue for exerting pressure on authorities, politicians, 
and bureaucracies in this regard is through the NGO sector. Several 
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14 reports have highlighted local initiatives that have challenged 
existing limitations in the Musrenbang process, pressuring for 
increased participation at all levels. Groups of local NGOs, rather 
than national-level organisations, take on the role as intermediaries 
between communities and the authorities, pressuring for specific 
projects to be lifted up through the budgeting meetings. This was 
evident in Kabupaten Jepara and Sumedang in North and Central 
Java, for instance, where local groups of NGOs pressured for closer 
collaboration with the DPRD budgeting teams. Their role has 
been to advice the DPRD Budget Committees and Budget Teams 
on project allocation prior to the district budget meetings (Ahmad 
& Weiser, 2006, pp.17-23). Likewise, in Solo, Central Java, NGO 
representatives have been able to participate in the actual budget 
formulation meetings (Sarosa et al., 2008, pp.32-34).
Other forms of NGO activities also concern creating space 
for oversight and lowering the threshold for intervening in the 
formal bureaucratic process. In places like Kebumen, Central Java, 
community NGOs specialising in different sectors of development8 
have targeted relevant technical offices and committees of the local 
government (SKPDs) in order to create dialogue and exert pressure 
on the formulation of their annual work plan. Following such 
pressure from NGO coalitions, in Sumedang and some other districts 
information about budget ceilings for villages and sub-districts has 
been put forward in the village Musrenbang. There are also several 
localities where local authorities, NGOs, and governors have sought 
to enhance the relevance and productivity of the Musrenbang 
process. The city of Solo stands out as a site in which the process has 
both received a lot of attention from NGOs and where communities 
mobilise in order to challenge existing structures (Sarosa et al., 2008). 
The second avenue for improvements has been to merge the 
formal Musrenbang process with already existing consultative 
processes and structures at the local level. This means that even 
though Musrenbang itself is highly formalised and bureaucratised, its 
execution seems to have great local variation. In the city of Blitar in 
8  GAMPIL and FORMASI   
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15East Java, Musrenbang has been accompanied by the implementation 
of a community block grant system focused on strengthening the 
Rukun Warga (RW) — the administrative unit at the hamlet level 
—  and the Rukun Tetangga (RT), or neighbourhood associations 
(Kuznezov & Ginting, 2005). The strengthening of RW/RT was 
desired in order to secure more direct representation of villagers, 
given that RW and RT heads were directly selected by members and 
residents of the RT/RW. 
The case study of the community block grant system in Blitar 
further noted that planning meetings called ‘pre-Musrenbang’ were 
held at RT/RW levels before they entered into the formal process. 
This provided the kind of flexibility in the Musrenbang process 
necessary for communities to feel ownership of the process. The 
positive outcome is primarily related to the specific projects that 
come out of the process, i.e. that they reflect the community’s 
immediate needs. This, however, indicates that whether the process 
has a more long-term effect on representation remains less clear. Also, 
how communities evaluate the process also depends on the capacity 
of community leaders to communicate to villagers their rights vis-
à-vis political authorities, the obligations of local governments in 
providing public services, and community leaders’ own ability to 
negotiate with political authorities and other elites. 
The Blitar case shows that there is a value in the learning 
process in that by participating villagers become more curious as to 
the role of government in service provision (Kuznezov & Ginting, 
2005). Similarly, a survey of their attitudes towards Musrenbang 
has showed that the sense of project ownership, and thereby also 
responsibility to see them implemented successfully, had increased 
by bringing the process down to RW/RT level (Dharmawan, 2005). 
Moreover, during a five-year period, it became clear that the kinds of 
projects that were proposed and that received funding had changed. 
Initially, the vast majority of projects were infrastructure projects, 
many of which were not seen to directly benefit the community.9 The 
9  For instance, money was spent on refurbishment and renovation of government 
buildings and village security posts.
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16 number gradually decreased to include work training programmes, 
microcredit schemes, and projects that focused on education and 
women’s issues. The shift was in part a result of critique from Blitar 
communities and in part from greater involvement of NGOs in the 
process. 
Yet, the critique of the pre-Musrenbang in Blitar is similar to 
the general critique raised elsewhere. There is a lack of accountability 
of key programme players and a lack of budgetary transparency 
(Kuznezov & Ginting, 2005). The size of such community projects 
should not be exaggerated considering that they only amounted to 
around two to five per cent of the annual city budget. In addition, 
the expansive use of planning consultants, contractors, and advisors 
in the project implementation phase has usually gone unchecked in 
the budgets. 
The fact that communities wage critique against existing 
norms and practices and wage protest on existing bureaucratic 
practices confirms what is already known of the high capacity for 
popular mobilisation in Indonesia. It is also an indication that 
Musrenbang processes may improve channels of communication 
between communities and political authorities. Yet, it is unclear to 
what extent that civic engagement in Musrenbang actually serves to 
improve democratic representation in politics. The role that NGOs 
in places like Solo, Bandung, Sumedang and Jepara, play as the main 
intermediaries between poor communities and authorities goes a 
long way in confirming earlier conclusions that despite high levels of 
participation and civic engagement, even in such concrete matters as 
community development, the door to formal politics remains closed 
(Nababan et al., 2005). 
KDP: Donor-funded community-driven development 
While Musrenbang is a process of enhancing community 
participation and transparency in the allocation of the regional 
government’s development funds for improved infrastructure and 
public services, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) has 
become a key programme in allocating state-funds to development 
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overview of how the KDP, first initiated in 1998, operates. Note 
that the KDP has been transformed into the National Program 
for Community Empowerment (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat, or PNPM), which was launched in 2008 to become the 
Government of Indonesia’s flagship poverty alleviation programme. 
The rural-based programme, PNMP-Rural, which is a continuation 
of the KDP, has become one of the world’s largest community-based 
poverty reduction programmes. It has been implemented across the 
nation in more than 60,000 villages. Since the launch of the KDP 
pilot project, the KDP has displayed explosive growth, reaching from 
25 villages in 1997 to more than 23,000 villages in 2003. In 2009, 
PNPM-Rural was launched by the President of Indonesia. It has 
scaled up annually from the 1100 kecamatan covered by the third 
KDP programme in 2006, to 4371 sub-districts under PNPM-Rural 
in 2009. PNPM-Rural currently covers 76 per cent of Indonesia’s 
kecamatan, totally 4791 villages. In June 2011, the PNPM-Rural 
was extended for another period to run until 2014 (Bank, 2011).10 
Hence, what we are witnessing is an unprecedented scaling up of a 
World Bank Community Driven Development (CDD) programme 
into a nation-wide poverty alleviation programme that combines 
various funding sources, including World Bank loans. 
Building on the theoretical notion that civic engagement is a 
central aspect of democratisation, as a community empowerment 
project the KDP seeks to empower rural poor and encourage more 
democratic and participatory forms of local governance. The basic 
CDD of the KDP is similar to the Musrenbang process in that 
resources are allocated to villages on a competitive basis for projects 
that villagers have chosen themselves. The task manager of the KDP, 
Scott Guggenheim, has noted that “the programme gives power 
10  PNPM includes five core programmes which collectively cover every sub-
district in the country. PNPM-Rural is the largest of the programmes. The 
four others consist of two World Bank-financed projects: PNPM-Urban and 
Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas; and projects financed by the Asian 
Development Bank and Japan International Cooperation Agency: PNPM Rural 
Infrastructure Support Program and PNPM Infrastructure form Socio-Economic 
Development.
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making process directly in the hands of villagers” (Guggenheim et 
al., 2004, p.6). 
Both in Indonesia and beyond, the KDP programme has 
been deemed impressive not only for its role in providing cost-
effective infrastructure, including clean water supplies and irrigation 
systems, but also for strengthening capacities of local communities 
by restricting the use of outside contractors, a problem associated 
heavily with weak channels of accountability and high levels of 
corruption in Indonesia. Regarding corruption, it has been argued 
that the proximity to communities and ownership to the very process 
of deciding on, building, and implementing a community project 
has not only created incentives for curbing corruption, but has also 
internalised methods that hinder it. Due to its overall structure, 
KDP has also been successful in increasing the ability of marginalised 
groups, including women, to access tertiary socio-economic 
infrastructure and other basic services. The World Bank reports that 
about 60 per cent of funded village proposals arise from women’s 
special meetings and for which a majority of the beneficiaries are 
below or at the poverty line (Bank, 2011, p.3). 
 On that note, while successful with regard to implementing 
projects, due to its broader mandate as a programme for social 
transformation the KDP ought also to be discussed in relation to 
its political prerogatives, specifically the role of the KDP in the 
Indonesian democratisation process. As a development programme 
with the interior aim of eradicating poverty, the KDP emerged as 
a post-Washington Consensus development programme with the 
ulterior motive of social improvement. In this regard, the KDP has had 
a defining focus upon creating a type of governance beyond what has 
been typically linked to the good governance agenda, usually associated 
with establishing liberal democratic institutions and frameworks for 
enabling free markets. As mentioned, as a foundation, Putnam’s 
social capital framework has served as a guideline for selling the idea 
to development technocrats and economists (Guggenheim, 2004). 
As such, the KDP has sought to change patterns of behaviour at the 
levels of society in very significant ways. For instance, infrastructure 
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transparency and accountability towards local authorities. The KDP 
has also become a tool for assisting in the decentralisation process, 
shaping its content at the local level (Carroll, 2006). Therefore, the 
World Bank views the KDP as having the potential to increase more 
broad and active forms of political participation beyond just the 
concerns of establishing a market. In this respect, it has been highly 
ambitious in its goal of reframing citizenship in post-New Order 
Indonesia. 
Framework: Top-down implementation
In contrast to the participatory planning processes on which the 
KDP is modelled, the KDP model is initiated and structured by the 
World Bank. This means that the popular foundations that proved so 
important for participatory planning processes to effectively enhance 
popular democracy and public service provision in other places such 
as Porto Allegre and Kerela were less central to the formulation of the 
programme’s content. 
Hence, although the KDP aims at building bottom-up 
participation and empowering local communities to take part 
in decision-making, it is primarily a top-down programme that 
bypasses the budgeting allocations of regional governments, which 
are, as discussed with regard to the Musrenbang process, slow, 
unpredictable, and often hampered by corruption.11 Avoiding the 
chains of local government and associated politicisation, the block 
grants are transferred down to collective accounts for the villages in 
three tranches, each being subject to certification and monitoring in 
the community. The Kecamatan Grants12 makes up the bulk of the 
11  In all of its three stages (KDP I, II, and III) the project derives its funds 
both from interest bearing funds from the WB Group’s International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and non-interest bearing funds 
from International Development Association (IDA), with varying grace periods 
of five to 10 years (Carroll, 2006, pp.8-9). Hence, the money supplied for the 
KDP from the World Bank Group constitutes debt. 
12 The Kecamatan Grants of the PNPM amount to a total of US$1097.58 million. 
As with previous KDP/PNPM-Rural projects, the present project is financed 
by a Specific Investment Loan (SIL), which allows the Indonesian Government 
to determine programme financing needs and the amount of foreign borrowing 
on an annual basis. The money is IBRD loans in US dollars with a variable 
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social infrastructure needed and requested by communities.13 The 
projects covered include: (1) planning for community development, 
including the preparation of sub-project proposals; (2) training 
and capacity building for communities, including in development 
planning and investment; (3) investing in social and economic 
infrastructure identified through community development planning; 
(4) investing in activities identified through community development 
planning and using revolving loan funds (RLFs) for women’s savings 
and loan groups that include micro-finance projects; (5) preparing 
for and responding to disaster, emergency or  catastrophic events, 
as needed, through sub-projects. There is also a component that 
provides Kecamatan Grants to pilot and special programmes (Bank, 
2011, p.3).14
The actual planning meetings are held at the sub-village and 
village level, but prior to planning meetings, workshops are held at 
district and kecamatan level to disseminate information about the 
programme. In order to include a broader spectrum of stakeholders, 
these workshops involve community leaders, local government 
officials, local press, academics, and NGOs. In addition, village 
meetings are held at the village and sub-village level to spread 
information and encourage villagers to come up with projects and 
propose ideas for KDP/PNPM-Rural support (Bank, 2011, pp.3-4). 
The frequency of these meetings varies as villagers become more and 
more familiar with the programme.
In order to counter the top-down structure inherent in the 
spread, final maturity of 24.5 years including a grace period of nine years, and 
annuity principal repayment, at a rate equal to LIBOR for the loan currency 
plus the variable spread. 
13  At the national level the Kecamatan Grants are managed by the Community 
Development Agency within the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, which 
is also the implementing agency (Carroll, 2006), while Bappenas manages 
a National Coordination Team whose task is to provide the overall strategic 
planning and coordination of the project implementation (Guggenheim et al., 
2004, p.9). 
14 Projects that are not supported are compiled in a negative short list that in 
addition to illegal activities include the financing of government salaries, and 
civil works for government administration or religious purposes (Guggenheim 
et al., 2004, p.8).
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empowerment within its formal execution. For instance the so-called 
Kecamatan Forum, which is set up to handle the distribution of funds 
to the village, includes specific leadership figures in the community. 
The forum consists of village heads, religious leaders, adat (traditional) 
figureheads, and teachers, in addition to three representatives from 
each participating village in the kecamatan. Moreover, empowerment 
of villagers is formalised through a system of ‘KDP facilitators’ who 
are selected from among the villagers themselves. Prior to the planning 
meetings two or three of these facilitators, of which at least one is to 
be female, are selected.15 The aim of maintaining a formal gender 
quota at the level of facilitators is to enhance female representation 
and participation at the local level. Their job is to assist villagers in 
writing up project plans, making decisions on the use of the funds, 
and play a crucial role in the planning meetings. These facilitators 
are central for securing local ownership of the process altogether. In 
this regard, the structure of creating formal avenues for bottom-up 
decision making implies that the kecamatan grant system also seeks 
to create new avenues of organising that may circumvent existing 
economic, social, and political organisation at the local level.
It is on this basis, as a social programme, that the KDP designers 
view the KDP as being substantively different from other standard 
development projects (Guggenheim, 2004, p.2). By placing emphasis 
on the process rather than the projects brings into focus an inherent 
expectation engrained in the KDP that participatory processes can 
bring about both social and political transformation. The fact that 
the KDP programme was the first development project funded by the 
World Bank to draw directly on social theory, and ‘in particular on 
writings from agrarian studies and comparative history’ (Guggenheim 
2004: 2), marked this ambition quite clearly. Yet, despite deriving 
inspiration from popular and social theory, there is no mention in 
World Bank documents or reports on its practical implementation 
that recognises the centrality ensuring bottom-up mobilisation and 
15 KDP II Operational Manual, downloaded from www.worldbank.org/id on 
Feb.2, 2011. 
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The design of the KDP and, ultimately, the PNPM show no effort at 
building organisations that can actually expand the bargaining power 
of villagers and marginalised groups in the planning process. Nor 
is there recognition of a wider understanding that the lack of such 
a popular basis at the heart of the participatory planning process is 
precisely what has hampered the potential benefits of participatory 
planning processes elsewhere (Avritzer, 2009). Instead, as the next 
section indicates, in the absence of such a popular foundation what 
is being delivered is a mode of governance that not only leaves 
fundamental power relations intact (Li, 2007, p.244), but also opens 
up a new space for top-down government intervention through the 
formalisation and streamlining of popular participation. 
What modes of governance are being delivered? 
While a notion of democratic participation is engrained in the 
overall expectations of the KDP, the programme essentially builds 
on a notion of achieving market functionality and not on building 
political or democratic notions of citizenship (Carroll, 2006). This 
brings attention to the perspective that neo-liberal forms of governance 
programmes such as the KDP seek to rework state-society relations 
and the basic notion of citizenship in very specific directions, via 
providing incentives for the provision of infrastructure and other 
public goods. The kind of governance that is being delivered by the 
KDP relates, therefore, specifically to the fundamental role of the 
World Bank in forwarding social transformation. In her analysis of 
the KDP and development programmes in Indonesia, Tania Li writes 
that
They [the social development team of the World Bank] sought 
a number of “specific finalities”. By optimising social capital 
or “getting the social relations right”, they thought they could 
supply village infrastructure more efficiently, alleviate poverty, 
promote economic growth, foster good governance, and 
enhance local capacities for conflict management –diverse ends 
that, separately and in combination, they thought would benefit 
the nation overall, and the poor in particular (Li, 2007, p.244). 
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formal and informal — are being created that enhance not only a 
particular form of development, but also nurtures a very particular 
brand of participation that remains largely disassociated from its 
intended popular foundation. Even though the KDP and PNPM 
are considered World Bank-sponsored government programmes, 
by channelling these directly to the villages much of the elected 
government is circumvented. Sub-districts are not fully autonomous 
units of government, and the administrative heads, the camat, are not 
elected and the kecamatan do not have any independent budget and 
contracting powers. Scott Guggenheim of the World Bank writes 
that 
Kecamatans seemed advantageous for some additional reasons 
above and beyond their accessibility to villagers. Because they 
were not a fully autonomous unit of government, they had 
no budget and contracting powers of their own. This meant 
that the collection of commercial and political interests that 
had a stronghold over government in the districts was much 
weaker in the sub-districts. Kecamatans also had a requirement 
to coordinate village development through a kecamatan council 
that included all of the village heads, but because the kecamatan 
has no budget of its own to invest, most of these councils only 
met once or twice a year (Guggenheim, 2004, p.21)16.
In the climate of corruption and illegitimate extraction of state 
resources associated with local level politics since the fall of the New 
Order, this perspective makes sense on the level of project efficiency, 
but less when it comes to enhancing democratic accountability. 
Hence, the strategy of bypassing existing institutions in its 
implementation is probably one of the reasons why the KDP has 
proven so efficient in both implementing and completing projects, 
but it also raises some important questions regarding the role of 
the kecamatan grant system at reworking state-society relations in 
a democratic direction. It remains a challenge to investigate both 
16 Accessed in March 2011. This extract has been removed from the current 
online version of the memorandum, but is also cited in Carroll (2006) and is 
available in print. 
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built and how such institutions operate vis-à-vis local government 
institutions and bureaucracies. Hinting at one possible result, the 
bypassing of elected office is likely to weaken and not strengthen 
the potential for improving and building popular platforms to unite 
reformist political actors and marginalised groups in civil society. 
Such unity would, as discussed, increase the likelihood for creating 
deeper forms of bottom-up participatory designs. 
Another factor central to the KDP and PNPM implementation 
is that social transformation is likely to be brought about through 
expert design. Li has noted that ‘natural communities required 
expert attention to make them complete’ (Li, 2007, p.267). 
Moreover, Guggenheim adds that “having villagers compete for 
KDP funds in kecamatan meetings would, we hoped, encourage 
the kinds of direct negotiations and cooperation that would provide 
a basis for rebuilding the supra-village horizontal institutions 
destroyed or neglected by the New Order’ (Guggenheim, 2004, 
p.21). Empowerment of marginalised groups becomes, therefore, a 
product that can be manufactured by technique, in the same way as 
sequencing theorists have argued that a democracy can be crafted via 
the introduction of liberal democratic institutions (Carothers, 2007) 
rather than as a result of prolonged struggles of social forces and 
interests (Hadiz, 2004, p.702). In sum, the above discussion shows 
that although the KDP can boast of major successes with regard to 
project implementation, participation rate, and ultimately poverty 
alleviation, all indicators of a successful development programme, 
it remains unclear how the participatory design on which it is built 
actually enhances democracy. Where the Musrenbang process is 
hampered by bureaucratic and institutional limitations, the KDP 
and, ultimately, the PNPM are ambitious in terms of goals, but lack 
concrete strategies for how to build and strengthen popular and 
social movement foundations. 
Sector participation: The structure and capacity of labour 
organising
In the same way as pro-poor political mobilisation takes place 
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located outside the formal arena for political contestation, the 
labour movement in Indonesia also lacks a unified labour-oriented 
platform to channel and represent labour interests. This means that 
even though national and regional labour unions boast increasing 
membership numbers, it is uncertain the extent to which they are able 
to channel labour interests into the formal political arena. Moreover, 
in contrast to Latin America and Eastern Europe, labour has only 
played a marginal role in the democratisation process in Indonesia. 
As discussed in the previous section on community participation, 
pro-poor policies in the form of development projects implemented 
at community level is usually the result of mediation between 
communities, usually via the NGO sector, civil bureaucracies, and 
individual politicians rather than of bottom-up political mobilisation 
by poor communities. In the absence of an effective labour party 
or platform, how do labour unions and activists mobilise, channel, 
and bring labour issues into the formal political arena in Indonesia? 
What strategies are available and what are the main limitations to an 
effective bottom-up inclusion of labour in politics? 
Historically, Indonesian labour organisations were central to the 
anti-colonial liberation movement. During the anti-colonial struggle 
and liberation wars of the 1940s, scholars have argued that the 
combination of workplace struggles with politics was inevitable due 
to the centrality of state and politics in the primitive accumulation 
of capital (Törnquist, 2011, p.203). During the Sukarno presidency, 
the common aim of building a national economy fostered one of 
the largest popular movements in which the Indonesian Community 
Party (PKI) was the primary force behind labour issues (ibid). Since 
the crackdown on the PKI in 1965-66, the union of progressive 
politics and labour has also broken down. 
The weak union between labour and politics in the post-Suharto 
era should be understood in the context of this crackdown on the 
popular labour movement and the evolution of the centralist and 
classic patrimonial New Order state. Within this system, unions 
and other mass organisations were integrated into the regime’s 
authoritarian corporate structures (Hadiz, 1997; Ford, 2009, p.16). 
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service and state-owned enterprise, were either excluded from the 
state-owned unions or sidestepped by bureaucrats and business 
owners. Moreover, in spite of the massive economic changes that took 
place since the late 1960s, which led to a dramatic expansion in the 
number of Indonesians employed as wage labourers17, these changes 
were strikingly  “unempowering for labour” (Winters, 2000, p.140). 
The way that workers were incorporated into new jobs in many ways 
subverted their capacity to form independent organisations that 
could place checks and balances on those who were in control of the 
state and the economy. 
The primary task of unions within the highly patrimonial 
system of personalised guarantees was to control rather than represent 
workers. One outcome was that most forms of anti-regime labour 
activism took place from outside the state-owned unions rather 
from within (Törnquist, 2004; Ford, 2009). The emergence of an 
alternative labour movement, which consisted of NGOs engaged 
with workers’ rights, including the NGO-sponsored workers’ groups, 
small ad hoc alternative unions across different sectors, in addition 
to spontaneous strikes and demonstrations by workers in response to 
specific concerns (La Botz, 2001; Ford, 2009). 
The ratification in 1998 of the Convention on Freedom 
of association and the protection of the right to organise, and 
the enactment of the Trade Union/Labour Union Act 21/2000, 
permitted any group of 10 workers to form a trade union. The current 
union landscape thus draws on two trajectories – the persistence of 
major unions that have their roots in the New Order era and new 
constellations of independent unions and labour NGOs, emanating 
in part from the former student movement that mobilised for workers’ 
rights in the 1990s. Moreover, since 1998 the major developments in 
the trade union landscape was characterised by the rapid expansion 
from a single state-owned union structure to the establishment of 
dozens of break-away factions and new trade union federations and 
confederations, as well as thousands of local enterprise-level unions 
17  This includes wage labourers in services, manufacturing, and agriculture. 
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Yet, despite these developments in the years leading to the 
collapse of the New Order and the changes in the legal frameworks 
for freedom of association since democratisation, scholars have 
agreed that labour did not play any significant role in the ousting 
of Suharto, nor has it emerged as a coherent, or as an effective voice 
or actor in the decade since democratisation (Winters, 2000; Hadiz, 
2002; Törnquist, 2004). Where pro-poor mobilisation suffers from 
a lack of a basic organisational structure and agenda, labour has an 
organisational vehicle with access to formal politics in-tact, yet its 
role is limited.
The main reasons for why labour has played only a limited role 
in the democratisation process in Indonesia are in part structural and 
historical (Aspinall, 1999; Hadiz, 2002; Ford, 2009), and in part 
due to insufficient political capacity and perspective on behalf of 
labour to make use of the political space that has re-opened since the 
end of the New Order (Törnquist, 2004, p.387). While the former 
is beyond the scope of this paper, the latter crystallises a point of 
departure in discussion on the strategies, options, and opportunities 
for current-day labour activists in promoting political change. 
Pressure politics and lobbying rather than mass politics and 
mobilisation 
The issue of organisational structure relates to the fact that in 
the absence of a coherent union strategy and efficient labour party 
collective labour organising, electoral advances for union leaders, 
or any form of policy outcome are dependent on the extent that 
unions develop support networks (national and international), 
maintain patrons (corporate and political), and lobby. The fact that 
national unions retain a hierarchical model based on geography with 
an executive board at the central level in addition to provincial and 
district levels means that unions also face a two-level challenge – 
one local and the other national. A central critique is precisely that 
this model has created a rigid and over-bureaucratised top-down 
structure in which concerns at the bottom are rarely tackled at the 
Civic Engagement and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia ...
28 top, and where local concerns hinder the formulation of a national 
agenda (Silaban, 2009, p.8). Similarly, the labour NGOs who also 
fear and criticise union ties to political goons or the corporate sector 
are also dependent on personal contacts and networking to survive. 
Many have chosen to pick their allies, often on an individual basis 
advocating a system of lobbying and pressure politics. Most recently, 
this has been evident in Aceh where progressive civil society and 
reformists fell short of executing their plans of a social democratic 
alternative to the former rebels’ clientelistic and top-down party, 
Partai Aceh, and instead opted for continuing to work from outside 
the formal party system (Törnquist, 2010; Uning, 2010).
In Indonesia, the main strategy for political impasse for labour 
is thus by way of pressure politics and lobbying, which translates into 
a continued dependency on networking and political clientelism. 
This structural turn towards pressure group politics and lobbying is 
an unfortunate departure from the potential that labour could play 
in forging democracy via mass politics and mobilisation bottom-up.
Role of NGOs
Ford notes that the role of NGOs directly concerned with 
labour issues seems to be on the demise with the explosion of formal 
labour unions, many of which have their basis in the NGO sector. 
Their position has also been challenged by workers’ groups that, 
although previously depended on them, have since been able to form 
independent and officially recognised labour unions. Yet, as is the 
case in general pressure politics in Indonesia, NGOs continue to play 
a crucial role in defining the labour agenda. Labour-oriented NGO 
activists are especially crucial for promoting and organising grassroots 
activism in the plant-level branches of trade unions associated with 
the large confederations. This tendency is in direct response to the 
criticism that unions are primarily top-down organisations. The 
main link between NGOs and workers is thus by contributing with 
assistance and know-how on efficient organisational procedures, 
labour law, as well as education and training. 
One example is the Trade Union Rights Centre (TURC), 
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to provide trade unions and legal training to trade union members 
(Ford, 2009). It is also common that NGOs and trade unions are 
cooperating in public on advocacy campaigns as well as seminar 
series and workshops, such as those run by the NGO Praxis and 
the Sedane Institute for Labour Information (Lembaga Informasi 
Perburuhan), and by international organisations such as the Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung (FES).18
Recent examples of such collaborative efforts that resulted in 
concrete policy reformulation included the submission of a citizen’s 
law suit against the President for neglecting to protect workers’ 
rights to social security. This was initiated by a collaboration of 
65 trade unions, NGOs, and research centres under the umbrella 
name Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial (KAJS, the Committee on Social 
Security Action). The main demand was on health and pension 
coverage through a new law on social security (the NSSS Law) 
(Thabrany, 2011). The main strategy of the KAJS has been to be 
reactive in relation to the government’s unwillingness to follow up on 
policy promises. KAJS has collected workers’ signatures to push the 
President to implement the law to secure social security to all (Ibid;). 
Another example is FSP KAHUTINDO (Federasi Serikat Pekerja 
Perkayuan Perhutanan dan Umum Seluruh Indonesia), in which the 
Forestry and Timber Workers collaborated with a number of NGOs 
in conducting training of its workers in the fields of sustainable forest 
management and UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (UN REDD) (Kleden & Kauppert, 2011). There 
have also attempts at forming more permanent forums for NGO-
union collaboration, such as the Indonesian Labour Movement 
Syndicate (Sindikasi Gerakan Buruh Indonesia) that has sought to 
bring together trade unions and worker groups in Medan, Jakarta 
and Surabaya, along with labour NGOs and people’s organisations 
(Ford, 2009, p.176). 
There are conflictive opinions regarding such collaborative 
efforts, as trade unionists have expressed opinions on NGOs 
18  http://www.fes.or.id/
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themselves. The most crucial issues for trade unions revolve around 
welfare and minimum wages, while NGOs have a myriad of agendas 
ranging from green jobs, environmental concerns to human rights 
and gender issues. NGOs have multiple roles depending on their 
wider agenda. Some have retained resources for improving union 
capacities, while in other cases NGOs are independent lobbyists 
seeking to define and determine union activities within their own 
agenda. 
Links to politics
As mentioned, in the immediate years after the fall of Suharto, 
factionalism was in part a strategic choice made by many pro-
democratic activist unionists who wanted to become as independent 
as possible from the state-controlled unions, regime-affiliated union 
bosses, and external patrons related to the manufacturing industry. 
Exit seemed the most viable option in the process of establishing an 
independent force (Törnquist, 2004, p.388). After the 2004 election 
there was a remarkable change in union attitudes towards politics 
(Ford, 2009; Silaban, 2009). Several unions formulated strategies, 
some of which were quite aggressive towards the 2009 elections, 
in particular the Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers’ Union 
(FSPMI) and the National Workers Union (SPN). 
Political parties began to approach trade unionists to stand as 
candidates in local assemblies. PKS, PAN, and PDI-P also approached 
labour NGO activists and other high profile members of NGO-
sponsored unions to stand for them in local and national elections 
in Greater Jakarta, East and West Java, North Sumatra, and Batam – 
are all major industrial centres (Ford & Tjandra, 2007; Ford, 2008). 
In the absence of a coherent and representative labour party, union 
activists stood in the 2009 elections for parties as diverse as Partai 
Buruh (the Christian Batak-dominated labour party headed by a 
long-time union leader), PDI-P, PAN, PS and Partai Golkar. Even 
Partai Gerindra, the party of Suharto’s former son-in-law General 
(ret) Prabowo, and General (ret) Wiranto’s Partai Hanura, received 
support from prominent union leaders and activists (Ford, 2009, 
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The diverse motivations for running in elections and the lack of 
a unified platform among union members in choosing specific party 
platforms has rendered the prospect for a special-issue party in the 
near future very unlikely. Still, “regardless of the success or failure of 
their political ambitions, the very fact that some mainstream unionists 
have seriously considered politics represents a sharp departure…from 
the position taken by the overwhelming majority of trade unionists 
in the early post-Suharto period” (Ford, 2009, p.180).
Cross-union collaboration
The turn towards pressure group politics and lobbying has 
resulted in the dominant approach to politics primarily being 
reactive rather than proactive. Both FES and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) have noted that this meant they did not 
have the organisational capacity to mobilise issues, and instead have 
waited for the government to issue a policy to then react. This is also 
reflected in a weak ability to propose viable political alternatives once 
a policy is put on the table (Silaban, 2009, p.93). 
Collective politics within this reactive strategy builds 
collaboration on specific issues. Union confederations have, for 
instance, sought to foster cooperation on particular issues such as 
preparing responses to government proposals on new legislation 
on minimum wages with assistance from international union 
organisations. At the local level, coordinating groups and bodies are 
set up, for instance, in Semarang where the local coordinating group 
includes organisations such as the KSPSI, KSPI and SMSI (Quinn, 
2003, p.9). Such coordinating bodies form in place of any formal 
collaboration and are, from the perspective of the national unions, 
informal and temporary. According to representatives from the ILO 
in Indonesia, these have proven important in terms of formulating 
more coherent responses to government proposals that concern 
labour. 
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With the support of international labour associations, efforts 
have been set in motion to mobilise and organise collective 
bargaining. Observers have noted that where collective bargaining 
exists, the agreements are often not very different from the minimum 
conditions required by law. An ILO consultant who carried out a 
programme for training on collective bargaining wrote that:
It is common practice in Indonesia for collective agreements 
to carry benefits already provided by labour laws…Since these 
benefits already exist in law why should they be carried in collective 
agreements? The practice of including normative provisions in 
collective agreements reflects a soft area in collective bargaining 
that needs to be addressed by the Indonesian trade unions. 
Incorporating benefits that already flow from legal enactments 
or decrees…crowds out advancement of other benefits that 
otherwise could be obtained through the bargaining process.19
An analysis of 109 collective agreements collected in five 
districts by the ILO confirms that many companies use the collective 
agreements simply to codify obligations under the law. This 
observation does not only reflect the weakness in collective bargaining 
frameworks, but perhaps, more importantly, demonstrates inability 
of labour unions to adequately formulate demands and mobilise on 
specific issues that concern their members. 
Alternative strategies 
Pro-women unions have been particularly vulnerable to political 
and economic pressure.  More recently, however, there has been a 
dramatic increase in women workers’ activism on their own behalf. 
This new wave of activism presents a dilemma for feminists of the 
international movement because it is not always framed in feminist 
terms. The middleclass feminist activists in the international union 
movements and NGOs tend to view female factory and migrant 
labourers as women first and then as workers. In contrast, many 
union women believe the international feminist agenda is secondary, 
19  Internal ILO document, Manuel Dia, Consultant. Cited in Quinn (2003). 
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(Ford, 2008). Hence, also here there is an important distinction 
between the discourse, goals, and strategies of the international 
labour movement and affiliated NGOs, and the localised strategies 
and agendas. 
In her study of women unionists’ strategies for strengthening 
their position within the Federation of Metal Workers Unions, 
the national-level federation incorporating the female-dominated 
electrical and electronic workers’ union, Ford notes that women have 
followed different strategies for strengthening their position within 
the union movement. One key strategy has been that of separate 
organising by developing women’s departments or other forms of 
women-only structures within an otherwise mixed-gender trade 
union. Another key strategy has been for women workers and women 
activists to create ‘non-union vehicles’ for representing their interests. 
Conclusion
Coming from a legacy of authoritarianism and low civic 
engagement, today’s Indonesia is known for its high associational 
density, i.e. the number of associational connections among the 
population including several participatory and mobilisational 
initiatives among marginalised groups. 
This article has shown and, in part, confirmed the notion 
that despite the introduction of participatory institutions by the 
government and donors, most notably the World Bank, opportunity 
structures favouring enhanced popular representation into formal 
politics have remained weak (Törnquist et al., 2009). Participatory 
institutions, such as the Musrenbang process and the KDP/PNPM 
umbrella are both examples of development programmes that are 
mandated and implemented by the central government, and thus 
lacking an initial popular base. Contrary to participatory designs 
that have proven successful in bringing citizens to the centre of the 
democratic project, such as Porto Allegre and Kerela, participatory 
institutions mandated through the Musrenbang, for instance, often 
suffer from rather weak and fragmented popular foundations, 
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political environment, and weak and unpredictable institutional 
frameworks. In its place, deeper forms of bottom-up participation 
would require a strengthened and improved institutional framework. 
More importantly, they would require a strengthened civil society 
that was able to seize the opportunities for participation, combined 
with enhanced unity in political society toward the need for 
participation. As Avritzer has noted, the success of civil society in 
creating viable bottom-up institutions has remained dependent on 
political coalitions with political society both to enhance bargaining 
power and to break down predatory elite patterns. The workings and 
intentions of KDP/PNPM make this disjunction in the Indonesian 
context particularly clear. The technocratic and programmatic design 
of the World Bank-driven programmes serves to streamline popular 
participation within a specific institutional design. Not only does 
the institutional design of bypassing the electoral channels serve to 
weaken democratic accountability, but is may also open up space for 
a new form of top-down government intervention. 
Although there is an inherent expectation that participation per 
definition will build political capacity and democratic citizenship 
among marginalised groups, it remains unclear exactly how the 
participatory model on which it is built actually enhances democracy. 
As the analysis has hinted at, the very design of such programmes as 
Musrenbang and the KDP/PNPM shows no recognition of the need 
for building organisations that actually expand the bargaining power 
of marginalised groups. That said, by broadening the discussion to 
include the Indonesian labour movement, a segment of associational 
life that historically has built its capacity and bargaining power on 
bottom-up mobilisation by marginalised and excluded workers, 
the analysis has complicated the picture. Weak representation is 
merely seen as due to poor institutional design and the persistence 
of predatory local elites and corrupt officials. The way civil society 
is organised, its capacity to make use of available political space 
and institutions and the extent that it is able to build strong cross-
sectoral coalitions is also central to the success. As shown, in the 
absence of a coherent trade union strategy and efficient labour party 
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develop support networks, maintain patrons, or lobby from outside 
the formal political arena. Seen in connection with the participatory 
institutions of the Musrenbang and the KDP/PNPM, a multifaceted 
problem is revealed –although the poor and excluded, alongside 
reformists NGO activists (Mietzner, 2012), are active ‘participants’ 
per se, as a group they remain fragmented and marginalised in formal 
politics, optimising pressure from outside of formal channels rather 
than instigating change from within.
From the discussion of two arenas for mobilisation and 
participation of marginalised groups in Indonesia, participatory 
development and labour organising, one can draw the important 
conclusion that associational density is indeed a poor predictor and 
indicator of democratisation. What the discussion shows is that it is 
not in fact the number of associations that generates democratisation, 
but that democratisation depends on the capacity of bottom-up 
associations, the type of actors they bring into politics, and as well 
as how formal and informal institutions adapt such incorporations. 
Against this background, the Indonesian case should remind 
foreign aid officials as well as democracy theorists of the vulnerability 
inherent in the early stages of democratic consolidation, in 
particular in relation to the process of creating avenues for improved 
representation of marginalised and excluded groups and distributing 
power between central and local authorities. As this article has shown, 
strengthening the capacities of associations rather than streamlining 
institutional frameworks should become a central concern for 
policymakers. After all, the government apparatus, still dominated 
by anti-reformist elites (Mietzner, 2012), is less likely to encourage 
the strengthening of collective bargaining powers of marginalised 
groups and a reformist civil society. The result of this strategy may be 
the provision of effective and successful development projects, but 
also continued fragmentation, social exclusion, and ineffective local 
institutions. 
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